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I. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES:

A. Goal One - To curtail drastically the amount of marihuana, cocaine, and other drugs entering the United States by disrupting the production of those drugs in Colombia and their illicit exportation to the U.S.

(1) Objective One - By means of a massive eradication project, to destroy marihuana and coca plants in the fields, which will preclude the involvement of the traffickers. COMMENT: It has been obvious for some time that interdiction alone is incapable of stemming the flow of narcotics from Colombia to the United States; therefore, the focus of the narcotics-control strategy in Colombia must shift from interdiction to eradication. This will not be possible, however, until the Percy Amendment has been repealed and the GOC has decided to carry out herbicidal eradication in Colombia. Although key Colombian officials and important members of the private sector agree that eradication would be effective in combatting Colombia's narcotics production, they are distressed over the use of herbicides, particularly paraquat. Undoubtedly,

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there are other anxieties, though less openly stated, bearing on the income and employment effects eradication may have, and its possible negative effect on Colombia's balance of payments, which will remain under pressure this year because of the sharp decline in coffee earnings prior to news of Brazil's frost. Even though Turbay's Administration has consistently been strong on narcotics control efforts, his lame-duck administration may not now be willing to intensify efforts against drug trafficking in Colombia, particularly one with the political and socio-economic impact of herbicidal eradication. The next Colombian administration is likely to share these concerns and would look to USG assistance to develop alternative sources of income for affected farmers. Furthermore, until the GOC is convinced that the USG is resolute in attacking its domestic drug problem, it will be difficult to induce the GOC to initiate eradication in Colombia. Though illicit crop eradication in Florida and other southeastern states may become a reality, California's inclusion in eradicating marihuana will be of paramount importance in Colombia. Moreover, as the environmentalists gather strength in the United States, so have they in Colombia. The President of the National Anti-Drug Coalition recently warned that introducing an eradication program in Colombia would not be easy, and that groups favoring the legalization of marihuana are already organizing environmentalists against the use of herbicides. The USG's apparent lack of serious commitment in handling its own drug problem is an ideal hook for any political party or foreign government to use as a stalling device in lieu of supporting a major program with the disruptive and controversial overtones of herbicidal eradication. The marihuana production problem in Colombia would still be far from over, even if herbicidal eradication were carried out. The disruption or elimination of major marihuana cultivations in the Guajira Peninsula would not erase the Llanos potential, or a shifting to other remote areas conducive to cultivation. In fact, recent interdiction successes by the National Police in the Guajira may do no more than remove the major marihuana-growing zone from a concentrated and relatively small geographic section to remote areas less easy to control and monitor. END COMMENT.

(2) Objective Two - To improve the effectiveness of cocaine interdiction in Colombia by intensifying efforts to stop the illegal entry of paste/base into Colombia for processing and export to the United States and other world markets. COMMENT: Continued close liaison through DEA channels is a key to success in this endeavor. Success here will also depend on securing the full cooperation of the major cocaine-producing countries, Peru and Bolivia.

(3) Objective Three - To increase the efficiency of Colombia's law enforcement agencies in locating and dismantling clandestine methaqualone-tableting and cocaine-processing labs. COMMENT: With respect to methaqualone, recent successes, coupled with controls imposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, should both have a strong impact on that market. Though it is too early to confirm, it is believed that a major disruption has already occurred. This is not to say that the methaqualone problem in Colombia has been nearly resolved, but that we would prefer at this time to see more intensified efforts directed toward our weakest link and strongest drug-of-the-moment, cocaine, with resources minimized in the methaqualone sector. END COMMENT.

(4) Objective Four - By means of diplomatic initiatives, media relations, and other public-affairs programming, to increase the understanding of public-opinion leaders and GOC decision-makers regarding the USG's commitment to wipe out international drug trafficking. COMMENT: Efforts will include persuading Colombians and their government that combatting illicit narcotics production (including eradication) and trafficking are in their country's social, political, and economic interest. USICA Bogotá will play a principal role in implementing this objective, along with higher echelons of the Embassy. END COMMENT.

(5) Objective Five - To identify as many drug traffickers as possible so they can be denied visas, thereby disrupting their modi operandi.

B. Goal Two - To increase significantly the quality of criminal prosecutions, with more convictions of key drug traffickers and, perforce, create a serious disruption of major drug-trafficking networks in Colombia.

(1) Objective One - To develop a plan of U.S. technical and commodity support for sustaining the GOC's efforts to (A) increase the capability of the Institute of Forensic Medicine in drug analysis and (B) establish a central reference bank of information on all narcotics activities in Colombia.

(2) Objective Two - To provide support for the GOC's trend toward improved judicial efficiency by furnishing information on U.S. and European systems, and arranging meetings between U.S. experts and carefully-selected Colombian officials visiting the United States under International Visitor grants or other auspices. COMMENT:

Colombian authorities are studying some major judicial reforms, including the establishment of a judicial career service with standards/criteria for judicial appointment and provisions for review of professional conduct. The implementation of these reforms will depend on Colombia's political and legislative processes, with which the U.S. should not be perceived as interfering; however, we should be prepared, if requested, to support this trend. END COMMENT.

(3) Objective Three - To train appropriate Colombian law enforcement officials in intelligence gathering and analysis, and provide a modicum of equipment for accumulating and processing intelligence.

2. USG RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE INC EFFORT IN COLOMBIA

A. The Embassy's Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU) is staffed by 12 personnel: 2 State Department direct-hire; 2 PASA from U.S. Customs; 4 American PSC's; and 4 FSN's. A special assistant to the Ambassador assigned to narcotics matters has an office within the NAU. Program Development and Support (PD&S) costs for FY 1981 are 580,000 USD. INC funds for bilateral project agreements planned for FY 1981 total 3,060,000 USD. If herbicidal eradication begins by FY 1982, annual costs for eradication alone would be 6.5 to 9 million USD, depending on the number of U.S. personnel required and the amount of aviation resources to be provided, pursuant to the Embassy's latest ZBB submission. Without an eradication project, bilateral interdiction projects should average about 3 million USD annually from FY 1982 through FY 1985.

B. The DEA has 10 agents in Bogotá, 2 Intelligence Research Specialists, and 4 support personnel. There are 2 agents in Cali and 2 in Medellin, for a total force strength of 20. The current annual budget is 184,000 USD plus 38,000 USD for 3 specially-funded intelligence projects. Until a firm narcotics-control strategy has been established in Colombia, and with no change in current strategy, the DEA's human and monetary resource contribution will remain approximately the same as at present.

C. Assuming the continued relative importance of narcotics-affairs programming during the next few years, USICA Bogotá will maintain an average resource contribution of .5 to 1 man-years per fiscal year for American officers, and 1 to 2 man-years per fiscal year for FSN's. These estimates actually involve many individuals, such as program officers and assistants; writers and editors; film producers and

VTR technicians, USICA management, and others. Approximately 2,500 to 5,000 USD per fiscal year for direct program support will be contributed, chiefly for speakers' expenses, simultaneous interpretation costs, travel and perdiem costs, and production of support materials for speaker programs. Between 11,000 and 15,000 USD will be contributed annually for International Visitor grants. USICA Bogotá may continue supporting the costs of Colombian television productions, with expenditures ranging from 6,000 to 8,000 USD annually. Printing costs average 1,500 to 2,000 USD annually USICA will continue to absorb the costs for salaries of the FSN's involved in narcotics-related media production and distribution, including costs for film, videotape, and printing materials costs, plus the expenses for binational-center facilities used for narcotics-affairs programs.

D. Several other sections of the Embassy, particularly the economic and political sections, provide information and analyses relative to narcotics matters on an ad hoc basis, adding up over the years to a substantial number of man-hours devoted to the narcotics-related activities of the INC Program in Colombia.

3. DOMESTIC RESOURCES

A. It is not likely that the GOC will contribute any resources to narcotics control other than manpower, salaries, and equipment, most of which was provided by the USG. The GOC's budget is currently under stress, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, on the side of both cash resources and expenditures. Even if the GOC were to pledge some cash resources for narcotics control projects, its commitment would still be subject to these stresses and could not be considered as firm.

B. Colombia would probably continue to carry out bilateral narcotics control projects indefinitely, as long as the USG provides substantial financial contributions, but the GOC's long-term commitment to unilateral narcotics control is questionable.

4. INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES

A. Although the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are aware of the narcotics-production problem in Colombia, and the desirability of providing alternative sources of income for campesinos engaged in the cultiva ion of illicit crops, none of the development

projects of either organization is directed toward Colombia's narcotics-growing areas. However, the GOC's commitment to rural development, which is reflected in programs for improving the quality of country life in general, may reduce the need for campesinos to turn to illicit-crop cultivation as the only alternative to bare existence. This is one of the principal justifications mouthed by the proponents of legalizing the cultivation of marihuana.

B. The program of Integrated Rural Development (DRI), in which both the WB and the IDB are involved, is taking place primarily in the departments (states) of Santander, Cordoba, Boyaca, Cundinamarca, Tolima, and parts of Antioquia, Nariño and Cauca, only the last of which has been identified as containing scattered coca cultivations. The FRI's second stage, planned for late 1981, will intensify efforts in these same departments, but will not extend to the marihuana-growing departments of the Guajira Peninsula, the Llanos, or to the Cauca areas where incipient coca cultivations have been found.

C. The Canadian Government is also cooperating in the DRI, with current projects in parts of Magdalena and Atlantico departments; however, these projects are centered on rural electrification and the development of transportation networks, neither of which are designed specifically to attack the narcotics-production problem.

D. When marihuana cultivations were discovered during the study stage of the El Retorno Land Settlement Project, the project was shelved because it was feared the proposed technology might have been ecologically harmful to the area.

E. With the WB's approval, the GOC executed a bilateral agreement with the Dutch Government, which will conduct a prodigious study to determine the type of technology best adaptable to the Llanos. The resultant development program in the Llanos may still deter the spread of narcotics production into that area, where such cultivation is not traditional.

F. Although the banks' assistance programs are unlikely to have a direct, short-term impact on narcotics production in Colombia, the DRI's side effects are likely to prevent the spread of narcotics cultivation, at least in other non-traditional growing areas. The DRI is designed to reach one-third of Colombia's rural poorest and focuses a considerable amount of official attention on the target areas. Before a farmer can receive DRI benefits, an

extension agent must examine his land and study his current economic situation to determine whether the applicant qualifies for the program and what type of assistance is most appropriate. Since the agent also makes periodic follow-up visits, it would be difficult for the farmer to hide or disguise any illicit cultivations. It is unlikely that many of the campesinos already engaged in the cultivation of illicit plants would apply for inclusion in the DRI program; however, a few of them may opt for the legal alternative for improving their standard of living. The question is whether the DRI can be extended throughout rural Colombia before drug-producing plants become the established crop.

5. PROGRAMS

A. There is only one INC Program in Colombia and it involves separate bilateral project agreements with the (1) Ministry of Defense, (2) Ministry of Finance, and (3) the Office of the Attorney General (OAG).

B. The USG's FY 1980 financial contribution to the MinDef Project was 13.2 million USD. FY 1981 funds have not been included thus far in the MinDef Project.

C. The USG's FY 1980 financial contribution to the MinFin (Customs) Project was 2.2 million USD. Also, 500,000 USD from FY 1981 funds have been added to that project.

D. The OAG Project has 500,000 USD from FY 1981 funds to support a flying services and aircraft maintenance contract.

E. Program Development and Support costs for FY 1980 were 516,000 USD. The total USG financial contribution for FY 1980 was 16 million USD.

F. Thus far in FY 1981, 580,000 USD have been allotted to the PD&S, 500,000 USD for the Customs Project. Distribution of the remainder of FY 1981 funds is planned as follows:

-- National Police Project (STOL Aircraft)	1,735,000
-- Ministry of Justice Project	325,000
Total Previously Allotted:	1,580,000
Total FY 1981 Funds:	3,640,000

G. The MinDef Project was executed in November 1980, which is the fourth revision of the original project agreement

with the military that was signed in September 1978. Revision 4 includes the National Police (NP) which has the military's former responsibility for interdicting narcotics (mostly bulk marihuana) in the Guajira area. The Air Force, Army and Navy are also included in the Revision 4 and provide support for the NP's interdiction efforts. Additionally, the Navy carries out interdiction activities on the sea, while the Air Force engages in airborne interdiction activities. The Army provides its support on the ground. EVALUATION: During the two years (1978-1980) when the military carried out narcotics interdiction in the Guajira area, it reportedly seized a total of 4,000 metric tons of bulk marihuana. This is an impressive sum when not compared with the estimated marihuana production figures for that area. Actually, the reported seizures represent only four percent of the estimated production during the same two years. During that same period, bulk marihuana seizures reported by all agencies, including the military, amounted to 4,180 metric tons, or 4.2 percent of the estimated production. The NP units assigned to replace the military in the Guajira area seized 745 metric tons of bulk marihuana during the first five months of 1981, which is 3.6 percent of the estimated production during the same period. Seizures of bulk marihuana for the same period reported by all agencies, including the NP, amounted to 787 metric tons, or 3.8 percent of the estimated production. As mentioned in Section 1, interdiction alone cannot serve the U.S. interest in curtailing severely the amount of marihuana (and other drugs) reaching the United States from Colombia. Unless eradication can be carried out with interdiction, it would not be cost effective for the USG to continue supporting hopeless interdiction projects in Colombia. If a combined eradication/interdiction effort is possible in the near future, it might be worthwhile for the USG to support it for a year or two, and then compare the results with the benchmarks previously established in this paragraph. The Embassy strongly supports this strategy and believes it to be consonant with the U.S. interest in Colombia. The USG's financial contribution for a combined eradication/interdiction effort in Colombia would average between 9.5 and 12 million USD annually for the next few years, depending on the number of U.S. employees required for the project and the amount of aviation resources to be provided and maintained (see the latest ZBB Submission). END EVALUATION.

H. The current Customs Project Agreement is the 6th Revision of the project which began in September 1978.

USG support for Customs is planned to be phased out during FY 1983. The current project provides for the purchase of a new, 105-foot patrol boat for the Customs Coast Guard, to increase the coastal enforcement of Colombian laws, particularly those relating to narcotics control. The project also provides training in narcotics identification and basic customs interdiction skills for 90 Customs personnel. The principal activity under the project will be the interdiction of marihuana, coca derivatives, and methaqualone by Customs personnel operating at both fixed and mobile, border and inland checkpoints, and at airports, seaports, and on the sea. EVALUATION: Customs has achieved about 70 percent self-sufficiency in the provision of training to is personnel and in narcotics interdiction. Customs narcotics arrests and seizures effected during the first five months of 1981 are down slightly in al categories from the results reported during the same period in 1980:

	Bulk Marihuana	Cocaine HCL	Arrests	(Dosage Units) Methaqualone
1980:	17.0 M.Tons	65.4 Kilos	51	143,737
1981:	16.2 M.Tons	47.5 Kilos	35	90,000

Customs should be self-sufficient in both interdiction and training by September 30, 1983, and no further USG support for that organization will be recommended after that date. END EVALUATION.

D. A six-month flying services and aircraft maintenance contract between the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and a private firm called Helivalle was signed on July 23, 1981. Revision 4 to the original project agreement with the OAG provides 500,000 USD from FY 1981 INC funds to support the contract, which involves three helicopters and one fixed-wing aircraft belonging to the OAG's Air Group. EVALUATION: It is too early to evaluate the project at this time. However, the contract will serve as a pilot project and if multi-agency use of the aircraft is not implemented, or if the "bottom line" is not substantial, in terms of relating flight hours to effective narcotics enforcement, no further USG support will be recommended. The Embassy's previous experience with the Air Group under the direction of the OAG has cost the USG over 3,000 USD for each hour of flight, with no multi-agency use of the aircraft and no bottom line of any consequence. END EVALUATION.

E. The GOC and the USG both recognize and agree that improving the Colombian judicial system is a Colombian

responsibility. Nevertheless, it is essential that the international operations of narcotics traffickers be countered by cooperative prosecutorial efforts in all countries affected by the illicit movement of drugs. It was in this spirit that a new Extradition Treaty and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty have been negotiated between the governments of the United States and Colombia. Accordingly, a bilateral project agreement is planned with the Ministry of Justice for the purpose of providing commodities and technical support to improve the efficiency of criminal prosecutions, particularly narcotics cases.

F. The USICA plays a significant role in narcotics matters in Colombia. It conducts public diplomacy programs fully supportive of the Embassy's narcotics affairs objectives, matching the relative priorities assigned those goals in the latest GORM submission. For Fiscal Years 1981-1982, narcotics affairs is the first priority objective in USICA's annual Country Plan, which outlines the use of USICA resources (Washington-supplied and Bogotá-generated) for bilateral relations objectives. For FY 1982, USICA Washington will include a theme of "narcotics trafficking" as one of the areas in which it is prepared to provide media, speaker and other support, as requested in the Country Plans of several posts.

6. FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE - None.

7. NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS - None.

8. NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS- The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) has a two-year project in motion with the GOC's Ministry of Health. The project commenced January 1981 and will terminate December 1982. The project actually augments the treatment currently being carried out in several existing hospitals in Colombia and deals with drug addicts/abusers. The rehabilitation methodology embraces medical treatment, consultations, and vocational training. Short-term consultancies are utilized on one or two-week TDY's from the World Health Organization. Funding for 1981 is 140,000 USD, with 108,000 USD allocated for 1982. The project also includes local seminars and fellowship grants.

9. EVALUATION - Evaluations were provided in Section 5.

WATSON